U.S. & China: Military Forces & Policies
U.S. & China: Military Forces and Policies:
Information and Analysis
Provided below are articles and documents that assess the military policies and capabilities of the United States and China, with the most recent posted first. They are intended to enable readers to form their own conclusions on the relative military power of the two countries, on the risks of war in a period of mounting U.S.-China tensions, and on the way they plan to employ their forces in the event of war.
For information on muscle-flexing actions by the military forces of the two countries, go to Provocative Maneuvers.
For information on the nuclear forces and doctrines of the two countries, go to Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control
U.S. and China Restore Military-to-Military Communications
Helene Cooper, The New York Times, Dec. 21, 2023
The U.S. and China resumed direct communications between their military officials on Dec. 21, 2023, after Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping agreed to restore such interchanges at their summit meeting outside San Francisco on Nov. 15, 2023. The military-to-military communications (or “mil-to-mil,” in Pentagon-speak) had been suspended by Beijing in retaliation for Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, considered a major provocation by Chinese leaders.
Direct communications between senior U.S. and Chinese military officials is viewed as a useful crisis-management and escalation-prevention measure, by allowing top officers from both sides to exchange information on an unfolding incident, hopefully allaying suspicions and allowing for the incident’s peaceful resolution.
On Dec. 21, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown spoke by teleconference with his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Liu Zhenli - the first since high-level conversation since Pelosi’s visit. The Times reported on their conversation.
“General Brown discussed the importance of working together to responsibly manage competition, avoid miscalculations and maintain open and direct lines of communication,” Capt. Jereal Dorsey, the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an email to reporters.
He said that General Brown “reiterated the importance of the People’s Liberation Army engaging in substantive dialogue to reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings.” The two military leaders discussed several global and regional security issues, Captain Dorsey said.
China’s defense ministry, in its account of the call, said General Liu stressed that “the key to developing a healthy, stable and sustainable military-to-military relationship is that the United States must have a correct understanding of China.”
House authorizers pass $839B defense budget, adding money for ships, aircraft, Ukraine, [and China]
Valerie Insinna, Breaking Defense, June 23, 2022
In this article, Valerie Insinna reports that the Democratic-led House Armed Services Committee (HASC) proposed adding $66 billion to the Biden administration’s proposed $773 billion Pentagon budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023. Included in the additional funding is $37 billion for new ships and planes, most of them oriented for a war in the Pacific. Here are some highlights from Insinna’s report:
Specifically, HASC added $3.65 billion for an additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, one additional frigate, an additional oiler, and two additional expeditionary medical ships. It also restores funding to prevent the decommissioning of five littoral combat ships and two expeditionary transfer dock ships. [These are all assets intended largely for extended operations in the Indo-Pacific region.]
The amendment also includes a major boost for aircraft procurement, buying an additional 25 warplanes and rotorcraft, to include: eight FA-18E/F Super Hornets, five C-130Js, two V-22 Osprey tiltrotors, two E-2D Hawkeyes, two CH-53K helicopters, four EC-37B Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft…. [These would be useful in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific.]
“We need only to look toward world events in Ukraine and read reports about China’s plans and actions in the South China Sea or simply read the latest headlines about Iranian nuclear ambitions and North Korean missile tests as well as ongoing terrorist threats to see why this funding is necessary to meet the security challenges of our time,” said Rep. Jared Golden, D-Maine, who supported the additions.
CNN: “Never mind China’s new aircraft carrier, these are the ships the US should worry about”
Analysis by Brad Lendon, CNN, June 26, 2022
Note: in this article, CNN’s Brad Lendon argues that China’s new aircraft carrier, the Fujian, doesn’t pose as great a threat as some Western commentators have claimed (see below), as it will be several years before it will be fully operational and even then, he says, it will be a sitting duck for enemy bombs, missiles, and torpedoes. Also, Lendon claims, the Fujian will not prove especially useful in the close-naval battles expected in any Chinese drive to invade and occupy Taiwan, where smaller and more versatile ships will prove more useful. Among the ships he thinks strategist should devote more attention to are:
Type 055 destroyer: Launched in 2017, these 13,000-ton stealth guided-missile destroyers are considered by many to be the most powerful surface combatants in the world. Big enough to be considered a cruiser by NATO standards, is equipped with 112 vertical launch tubes that can used to fire everything from anti-ship missiles to long-range land-attack missiles.
Type 039 submarine: These Yuan-class submarines are almost silent diesel-electric-powered boats with capabilities that could prove tough for US military planners to deal with. Beijing has built 17 of the Type 39A/B subs, with plans to increase that total to 25 in the next three years, according to the Pentagon’s 2021 report to Congress on China’s military power.
Merchant Ferries: To invade Taiwan, China would likely need to transport an invading force of hundreds of thousands of men. Various analysts – and US government reports – have concluded the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) naval fleet is not up to that task. But what China does have is a massive fleet of civilian ferries that could be swiftly converted for military use.
Maritime militia: Experts also accuse China of creating a maritime militia, made up of more than a hundred vessels supposedly engaged in commercial fishing, to enforce its wishes in disputed seas. The militia – which Beijing denies even exists – is made up of at least 122 vessels and likely as many as 174, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
China launches third aircraft carrier in military advance
Agence France-Presse via the Guardian, June 17, 2022
As reported by AFP, China launched its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, on June 17, marking a significant military advance for that country’s navy. The Fujian is the first carrier entirely designed and built in China; its other two carriers were modifications of Soviet models.
Launched in a Shanghai shipyard to great fanfare, the Fujian is more technically advanced than the other Chinese carriers. It is the “first catapult aircraft carrier wholly designed and built by China,” said the state broadcaster CCTV.
President Xi Jinping has overseen an overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army since coming to power in 2012, and has pledged to build a “fully modern” force rivalling the US military by 2027.
However, it will be years before the Fujian reaches operational capacity, and the defence ministry has not announced a date for entry into service.
China has two other aircraft carriers in service. The Liaoning was commissioned in 2012, and the Shandong entered service in 2019. Unlike the Fujian, they use a ski-jump-style platform to launch aircraft and do not have a catapult launcher system.
Chinese army faces problems in weapons innovation, relying on foreign acquisitions, US study finds
Owen Churchill, South China Morning Post, July 15, 2021
NOTE: This article refers to a report by the Pentagon-funded RAND Corp. of Santa Monica, CA on China’s difficulties in trying to match advanced U.S. military capabilities. According to the article, China lacks the advanced technologies needed to compete with the U.S. and so must rely on intellectual property (IP) theft to obtain the necessary know-how – an obviously flawed approach to modernization. It also discusses corruption in China’s state-owned military companies, which are responsible for most of China’s defense production.
Contending that China had failed to spur military innovation of its own, the Rand report cited three key deficiencies confronting the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): high-end semiconductors, stealthy submarines and aircraft engines.
A reliance on IP theft has left Chinese weapons systems “several years” behind their US counterparts, researchers concluded, noting striking similarities between China’s J-20 and J-31 jet fighters and Lockheed Martin’s F-22 and F-35 aircraft, respectively.
Aircraft engines have long been a bottleneck in China’s military advances, with turbine blade technology in particular proving to be a persistent problem. The PLA’s highly prized J-20 stealth aircraft, for instance, relied on Russian engines that left it underpowered.
China’s aircraft carriers: Can PLA strike a balance to compete with US?
Minnie Chan, May 15, 2021, South China Morning Post
In this article, Minnie Chan summarizes recent news and analysis about the expansion of the Chinese navy, known as the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN. She cites a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimating that the PLAN will receive nearly 100 new ships by 2030, giving it a total of about 425 battle-force ships. Part of the motivation for this buildup, she writes, is to catch up with the U.S. Navy, which has 11 aircraft carriers – nine more than the PLAN – and to add more than a dozen amphibious assault ships to support its global strategy.
But Chan also cites a number of Asian analysts who question China’s ability to match the U.S. in naval combat power, among them Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Tong:
He said one of the reasons for the collapse of the former Soviet Union was its costly nuclear submarine strategy. “It’s impossible for the PLAN to copy the US navy’s aircraft carrier strategy, too. The US has several huge naval bases in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Guam base, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and the seventh fleet’s headquarters in Japan’s Yokosuka, enabling it to form several containment arcs to contain a rising China,” Wong said.
“Unlike other surface warships, both aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines need specific and dedicated ports for logistic support and maintenance when sailing farther from home waters, but so far China just built its first and only military outpost, in Djibouti.
Wong said Beijing had been planning to set up overseas military outposts in Myanmar, Pakistan and other Beijing-friendly African countries since the mid-1990s, when China became a net oil importer, but progress was limited almost two decades later. “Besides ‘China threat’ theory, the Chinese foreign ministry’s Wolf Warrior diplomatic policy should also be blamed, causing many countries to remain suspicious about the ambitions behind Beijing’s naval expansion,” he said.
“A US Air Force war game shows what the service needs to hold off – or win against – China in 2030”
Valerie Insinna, Defense News, April 12, 2021
This article describes a classified war game conducted by the U.S. Air Force in Fall 2020 and described in general terms to the author in March 2021. The exercise involved a simulated Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2030. The article claims that despite the introduction of advanced weaponry, the U.S. was not able to overcome superior Chinese airpower in the exercise scenario.
The U.S. Air Force repelled a Chinese invasion of Taiwan during a massive war game last fall by relying on drones acting as a sensing grid, an advanced sixth-generation fighter jet able to penetrate the most contested environments, cargo planes dropping pallets of guided munitions and other novel technologies yet unseen on the modern battlefield.
But the service’s success was ultimately pyrrhic. After much loss of life and equipment, the U.S. military was able to prevent a total takeover of Taiwan by confining Chinese forces to a single area. Furthermore, the air force that fought in the simulated conflict isn’t one that exists today, nor is it one the service is seemingly on a path to realize. While legacy planes like the B-52 bomber and newer ones like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter played a role, many key technologies featured during the exercise are not in production or even planned for development by the service.
Still, the outcome was a marked improvement to similar war games held over the last two years, which ended in catastrophic losses. In similar war games held in 2018 and 2019, the Air Force failed disastrously.
The 2018 exercise involved an easier scenario in the South China Sea where the service fielded a force similar to the one it operates today; but it lost the game in record time. The following year, during a Taiwan invasion scenario, the Air Force experimented with two different teams of aircraft that either operated inside of a contested zone or stayed at standoff distances to attack a target. The service lost, but officials believed they were closer to finding an optimal mix of capabilities.
The remainder of this article describes the sort of aircraft and tactics the Air Force believes it will need to prevail in a future conflict with China in the western Pacific area.
China’s navy has more ships than the US. Does that matter?
Geoff Ziezulewicz, NavyTimes, April 9, 2021
In this article, the author discusses a March 2021 report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the Chinese navy - China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – indicating that China’s fleet strength is likely to exceed that of the U.S. Navy in the years ahead. The author asks whether the sheer number of vessels matters as much as other indicators of battle strength, such as quality of vessels and training.
According to the CRS, China is on pace to have 425 battle force ships by 2030. Sheer size and numbers carry a quality all their own, and a numerical advantage would be of benefit in a small battlespace like the Taiwan Strait, some China watchers say.
Still, others note that because the U.S. Navy has been doing this a lot longer than the growing Chinese force and is aided by the naval might of America’s allies in the region, the U.S. retains key advantages that extend beyond any mere hull tally.
The U.S. Navy also has vastly more experience with global maritime operations. China’s Navy has little or no proven capability for things like carrier aviation, blue-water deployments and underway replenishments – all of which would be necessary for the Chinese to project naval power beyond their coastal zones.
US troops practice island warfare concepts designed to control Western Pacific sea lanes
Matthew M. Burke, Stars & Stripes, March 18, 2021
In this article, Burke describes “Exercise Castaway,” a U.S. Marine Corps training exercise conducted on Ie Shima, a small island off Okinawa’s northwest coast, designed to show how a relatively small, widely dispersed force could seize and hold useful territory in the early stages of a conflict in the Pacific, presumably with China.
In the exercise, the Marines deployed small groups of highly trained troops, fast-moving artillery and stealthy fighter jets to grab territory from which rockets could launch…. The tactic is called expeditionary advanced base operations.
[“Castaway” was] the most comprehensive expeditionary advanced base exercise, so far, 3rd Marine Division spokesman Maj. Kurt Stahl told Stars and Stripes on March 15. Like earlier exercises, it involved Marines and sailors practicing an island airfield seizure and deploying a Marine M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS.
“What we’re doing is working on establishing an austere position where we can basically prosecute long-range precision fires, and that allows us to basically deny the sea lane,” said 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines commander Lt. Col. Roe Lemons Jr. after the [HIMARS] battery arrived. “For us, it’s like a road intersection, but on the water.”
What Do We Know About China’s Newest Missiles?
Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer, DefenseOne, March 19, 2021
In this article, the authors note that a great deal of information can be gleaned from open sources about China’s new missiles.
Since 2017, they note, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the service responsible for China’s conventional and nuclear missiles, has added 10 brigades – more than a one-third increase – and deployed an array of formidable new weapons. These new systems include the intermediate-range DF-26 ballistic missile, DF-31AG and DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, CJ-100 cruise missile, and DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle. A new nuclear-armed DF-21 variant, speculatively referred to as the DF-21E, may have also been deployed but has not yet been officially unveiled.
We know the most about the DF-26, which is thought to be able to strike ground and naval targets out to about 4,000 kilometers. Publicly revealed in 2015, this IRBM has quickly become one of the PLARF’s most widely deployed systems, equipping at least five brigades so far…. One of the most notable aspects of the DF-26 is its ability to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads. At least one brigade is known to train for both missions. This mix complicates thinking about China’s nuclear deterrent. A U.S. strike on such a brigade risks hitting China’s nuclear arsenal.
(More information about the DF-26 and other Chinese missiles is provided in this article. For the full text, press here)
Senator Tom Cotton: “It is very expensive and hard work to win an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race than to lose a war.”
GOP Lawmakers Push Chinese Threat at Indo-Pacific Commander’s Hearing
Elizabeth Howe, March 9, 2021, DefenseOne
In this article, Elizabeth Howe describes comments made by Republican senators at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing featuring testimony by Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. During the hearing, Davidson argued for an increase in U.S. military spending to better enable U.S. forces to engage China in warfare. Many of the Republicans on the committee sought to emphasize the need for even greater anti-China spending.
Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., asked Davidson whether China could achieve “nuclear overmatch” against the United States before the end of the decade if it were to triple or quadruple its nuclear weapons stockpile – something that might happen, according to U.S. Strategic Command leader Adm. Charles Richard.
Davidson responded that, yes, China would surpass the U.S. in nuclear capability should China quadruple its stockpile. He declined to endorse the notion that China might again boost its arsenal fourfold by 2030, though he said, “They’ve quadrupled their nuclear capabilities since the turn of the century and they will at least double it during the course of this decade.”
While others have disputed China’s ability or intent to “overmatch” the Chinese nuclear arsenal, Howe indicates, Cotton persists in stressing the China threat and the need for a massive U.S. response, describing the situation as an arms race.
“It is very expensive and hard work to win an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race than to lose a war,” he said.
The Pentagon Can’t Spend China into Submission, But Alliances Can Deter It, House Dems Say
Elizabeth Howe, Defense One, March 10, 2021
In this article, the author describes a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 10 which heard testimony from Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, who called for a substantial increase in military spending to confront China. In response, leading Democrats on the committee called for greater reliance on allies, rather than open-ended spending.
“The idea that we can build a military large enough and strong enough to dominate China in the modern world is not realistic and is fraught with danger,” said Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash. “So I hope we can better understand how to make proper investments.”
The presence of United States forces in the region was never questioned. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle agree that the U.S. must maintain a military presence in the Indo-Pacom region. But funding such a presence – installations, equipment, personnel, and joint exercises – is only possible if U.S. allies do the same.
“The United States simply can't do this alone. And certainly not in isolation,” Rep. Anthony Brown, D-Md., said at the outset of his questioning.
A War with China Would Spread to Land, Says Army Tanker
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Breaking Defense, March 11, 2021
In this article, Freedberg reports on comments by Maj. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman, head of armored vehicle modernization at the U.S. Army Futures Command, at a March 10 webcast sponsored by CSIS. Coffman’s comments pertained largely to the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), the intended replacement for the Reagan-era M2 Bradley, but also strayed into the Army’s vision of what a war with China might look like and how that would affect requirements for the OMFV.
The OMFV, Coffman said, would have to be optimized for Asian as well as European battlefields.
The reason? As Maj. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman, a tanker himself, emphasized… while any conflict with China may start at sea or in the air, there’s no guarantee it’ll stay there – and in any land battle, you need armored vehicles, as shown by Pacific history from Iwo Jima to Hue.
China’s strategy has been to push for advantage around the globe, so a shooting war that starts in the South China Sea or Senkaku Islands might metastasize to land battles as far afield as Africa, where China has a growing presence, Coffman told the CSIS event. Or, as he put it to me afterwards: “China’s proven it will not self-limit in [peacetime] competition, so we cannot expect them to self-limit in [armed] conflict. The place and time of that conflict are yet to be determined, so we’ve got to be able fight no matter where we are.”
Rep. Adam Smith: A U.S. Drive to dominate China militarily would be “unbelievable expensive, unnecessarily expensive…and pretty much impossible”
In a March 2021 interview with Connor O’Brien of PoliticoPro, Rep. Adam Smith (D.-Wash.), Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed skepticism about the need for additional spending on weaponry aimed at overpowering China.
‘I think that’s a mistake’: Smith is clearly undecided about what, if any, additional investments need to be made to beef up U.S. military preparedness in the Asia-Pacific, which is the Biden administration’s primary regional focus. In fact, he warned that the whole approach may be all wrong.
“I am worried that we are running towards the idea that the only way to deal with China is to build a military that is large enough to dominate them,” Smith added. “I think that's a mistake. I think it's unbelievably expensive, unnecessarily provocative, and also in the modern era of warfare, pretty much impossible.”
China's March 2021 National People’s Congress Emphasizes Military Modernization: China’s NPC and CPPCC: Xi Defies the West
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, March 8, 2021
Early March witnessed the annual sessions of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a top advisory body. A major feature of these events was the presentations of the annual Government Work Report (GWR) to the NPC, delivered on March 5 by Premier Li Keqiang.
In this article, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, an Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, summarized Li’s presentation. He focused on China’s determination to gain greater self-sufficiency in technology, to crush political dissent in Hong Kong, and to boost its military capabilities. An excerpt from the section on the military objectives follows.
Premier Li took an aggressive stance on the need for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to seek “new, major achievements.” The PLA’s budget this year is projected at 1.36 trillion yuan ($206.16 billion), a 6.8 percent increase over last year. While this was only slightly more than the similar increase of 6.6 percent in 2020, it is well known that the published budget does not cover costs for the development of new weapons (Deutsche Welle Chinese, March 5). Li stressed that army building must follow “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army.” Pointing out that the military in the new century must abide by a “CMC chairman responsibility system,” Li underscored the imperative of “building up the army through [stressing] politics, and strengthening the forces through reform, technology and talents.” “We must comprehensively strengthen training and preparation for warfare,” Li added. “We must coordinate the strategic ability to [handle] risks to [national] safety in all directions and all arenas” (China News Service, March 5). Li was repeating recent talking points made by Xi. For example, the CMC chairman indicated in a speech to military officers in January that the PLA must “boost its ability to fight and to win wars” (Xinhua, January 4).
China boosts defense budget again, exceeding $208 billion
Mike Yeo DefenseNews, March 5, 2021
According to this article, China will increase its defense budget by 6.8% in 2021. This represents a slightly larger jump than last’s year’s increase of 6.6%, and demonstrates Beijing’s drive to continue the modernization of its military forces.
The country will spend 1.35 trillion yuan (U.S. $208.58 billion) on its military, according to figures released by China’s Finance Ministry as the country’s leadership convenes for its annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing.
During his speech to the largely rubber-stamp legislature, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reiterated that efforts to strengthen the People’s Liberation Army will continue. He pledged to boost military training and preparedness across the board as well as improve the country’s approach to defense-related scientific, technological and industrial efforts, without providing further details.
A key focus of the modernization effort, Yeo reports, is China’s navy, with eight modern cruisers now under construction along with China’s third aircraft carrier plus three new amphibious helicopter carriers.
In a March 4, 2021 “Message to the Force,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin laid out the governing principles for his stewardship of the Dept. of Defense. Second after “Defeat COVID-19” was “Prioritize China as the Pacing Challenge.” Here is the text of that key paragraph:
The Department will prioritize China as our number one pacing challenge and develop the right operational concepts, capabilities, and plans to bolster deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage. We will ensure that our approach toward China is coordinated and synchronized across the enterprise to advance our priorities, integrated into domestic and foreign policy in a whole-of-government strategy, strengthened by our alliances and partnerships, and supported on a bipartisan basis in Congress.
Indo-Pacific Commander Delivers $27 Billion Plan to Congress
Paul McLeary, Breaking Defense, March 1, 2021
On March 1, according to this article, Adm. Phil Davidson, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, delivered to Congress a report calling for an additional allocation of $27.3 billion over the next five years for military enhancements in his area of responsibility, on top of the funds already allocated in the defense budget. The additional funds, part of what Davidson calls a “Pacific Deterrence Initiative,” will be used to buy new missile defense systems, place radar and missile defense systems on the ground, launch satellites and build state-of-the-art training ranges across the region. The plan includes $4.6 billion in fiscal year 2022.
The document tells lawmakers that the US “requires highly survivable, precision-strike networks along the First Island Chain, featuring increased quantities of ground-based weapons. These networks must be operationally decentralized and geographically distributed along the western Pacific archipelagos using Service agnostic infrastructure.”
At the top of the admiral’s acquisition priority list is a $1.6 billion Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Guam, something he has long said is his No. 1 priority. Next is a $197 million “Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar” to be placed in Palau to detect and track air and surface targets…
The document also includes $2.3 billion to build and launch “a constellation of space-based radars with rapid revisit rates to maintain situational awareness of adversary activities” which could feed into Aegis Ashore and the Palau systems. Davidson is also looking for $206 million for “specialized manned aircraft to provide discrete, multi-source intelligence collection requirements” across the region, along with $3.3 billion for “highly survivable, precision-strike fires” that can support troops on the ground, ships at sea and aircraft from distances greater than 500km.
Indo-Pacom Seeks Billions to Move Forces ‘West of International Dateline’
Stew Magnuson and Meredith Roaten, National Defense, March 8, 2021
Further details of Davidson’s plans for a Pacific buildup (see above) were revealed in comments on March 8 by George Ka’iliwai III, director of requirements and resources at the Indo-Pacific Command, at the National Defense Industrial Association's Pacific Operational Science and Technology conference. Ka’iliwai III said the command will also ask for an added $4.7 billion in the fiscal year 2022 budget request to buy equipment and capability to deter Chinese aggression.
The command also wants to redistribute forces west of the International Dateline where they would provide a “credible demonstration of U.S. resolve and commitment,” slides presented at the conference said. That would come to $2.3 billion in 2022 and $6.7 billion from 2023 to 2027 [for a total of $9.0 billion].
The breakdown would be: $1.6 billion to redistribute forces and build training facilities for U.S. territories and states in 2022, plus $4.6 billion over the following five years; $114 million in Oceania nations in 2022, and $481 million over the next five years; $51 million for Southeast Asia plus an additional $879 million from 2023-2027. “Construction activities” in the regions would come to $474 million in 2022, plus $673 million in the following years.
To strengthen a network of alliances and partnerships against China, Indo-Pacom is asking for about $533 million in 2022 for fusion centers, training, international security cooperation and State Partnership Program funds, and another $2.8 billion for these efforts from 2023-2027.
Technology on the wish list includes: a Guam-based missile defense system with a 360-degree capability that would cost $350 million initially, plus $1.3 billion from fiscal years 2023 to 2027… Ground-based long-range fires for the First Island Chain would have a price tag of $408 million, plus $2.9 billion over the subsequent five-year period. An over-the-horizon radar for Palau is $168 million in fiscal year 2022 and $29 million thereafter.
The China threat is being inflated to justify more [military] spending
Dan Grazier, DefenseNews, Feb. 12, 2021
In this opinion piece, Dan Grazier, a former Marine Corps captain who served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan and is now the Jack Shanahan military fellow at the Project On Government Oversight, argues that the Biden administration’s decision to appoint a task force to review U.S. military force posture could “risk falling into the same pattern of past blue-ribbon panels: provide cover for elected officials to back unpopular policy recommendations that will end up fulfilling the wish list of the defense industry.” Citing testimony by top Biden appointees before the Senate Armed Services Committee and comments made by leading Senators, he sees a repeat of past eras when defense hawks exaggerate overseas threats to keep military budgets high at the end of foreign wars. Here are selected excerpts from his article:
Lawmakers, Pentagon leaders and defense industry-funded think tanks have been ramping up “great power competition” rhetoric for years as a ploy to justify greater military spending…. This specter of an imminent military threat fits within a pattern that emerged after the Korean War nearly 70 years ago. When spending levels threaten to dip, discussion of a new national security threat ramps up to coax defense spending safely upward. Warnings of a supposed missile gap filled newspaper columns at the beginning of the Kennedy administration, and President Ronald Reagan pushed a massive military buildup to flesh out the post-Vietnam War “hollow force” to confront the Soviets.
Breathless mentions of China, Russia and “great power competition” appear to be the reaction to Pentagon spending levels dipping below the 5 percent line in 2015 as the post-9/11 wars diminished in scope. China is an obvious competitor in the 21st century, but does it make sense to build a military to fight to and beyond the shores of the Asian mainland? It’s virtually impossible to see how such a war could be fought without one side resorting to nuclear weapons. That has been demonstrated in war games conducted by U.S. Strategic Command. Even if such a war could be limited to conventional weapons, any invasion force we could put on the ground in China would be quickly overwhelmed.
But here’s the good news: We don’t have to…. The Chinese military advantage evaporates as you move beyond its shores. The Chinese defenses are almost all based on land and meant to keep invaders at a safe distance rather than project its own military power forward. Rather than heavily investing in weapons like Ford-class aircraft carriers and stealth aircraft designed to penetrate territory claimed by China, the United States should build a force capable of stopping any aggressive moves China might attempt in the region.
The challenge facing civilian and military leaders today is not to build new weapons to fight with old ideas. We should first find ways to peacefully coexist with other nations. Failing that, we should find ways to out-think our adversaries.
Biden Appoints Pentagon Task Force to Review U.S. China Policy
During his first visit to the Pentagon on Feb. 21, President Joe Biden announced the establishment of a high-level Pentagon task force to assess U.S. defense policy vis-à-vis China and to submit a report with recommendations to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin within four months. The task force will be composed of “up to” 15 civilian and uniformed officials, and will be led by Ely Ratner, a former deputy national security adviser to Biden who joined the Department of Defense (DoD) as Austin’s special assistant on China.
According to a fact sheet released by the DoD on February 10 (see below), the task force “will be a “sprint” effort, examining high-priority topics that include: Strategy; Operational concepts; Technology and force structure; Force posture and force management; Intelligence; U.S. alliances and partnerships; and Defense relations with China.”
No public record of the task force’s recommendation “is anticipated,” the fact sheet states, “although the Department will discuss recommendations with Congress and other stakeholders as appropriate.”
Office of the Secretary of Defense Fact Sheet: DoD China Task Force Announcement February 10, 2021
On February 10, President Biden announced the upcoming establishment of the Department of Defense [DoD] China Task Force. This initiative will provide a baseline assessment of DoD policies, programs, and processes on China-related matters and provide the Secretary of Defense recommendations on key priorities and decision points to meet the China challenge.
The Task Force will have up to 15 civilian and uniformed DoD employees.
The Task Force will draw from a cross-section of the Department, to include representatives from:
o Office of the Secretary of Defense
o Joint Staff
o Military Services
o Combatant Commands
o Intelligence Community
The Director of the Task Force will be Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ely Ratner.
The task force will be a “sprint” effort, examining high-priority topics that include:
o Strategy;
o Operational concepts;
o Technology and force structure;
o Force posture and force management;
o Intelligence;
o U.S. alliances and partnerships; and
o Defense relations with China
The task force will align its recommendations with interagency partners to ensure DoD continues to support the whole-of-government approach toward China.
The task force will provide the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense its final findings and recommendations no later than four months after establishment. No final public report is anticipated, although the Department will discuss recommendations with Congress and other stakeholders as appropriate.
Formal DoD guidance will be issued in the coming weeks.
A New Estimate of China’s Military Expenditure
In January 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) issued a new paper providing a detailed breakdown of the Chinese military budget based on publicly available information in both Chinese and English. Such research is needed, the paper noted, because China’s official account of its defense budget does not include many items that researchers at SIPRI believe should be included in a full accounting of its military expenditures.
For example, SIPRI argues that spending on the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is not adequately included in China’s “national defense” account, even though the CCG has come to perform a quasi-military role in the East and South China Seas. Likewise, SIPRI believes that the official defense figure does not accurately represent spending on arms imports and weapons research and development. As a result, the official figure is considerably lower than what SIPRI believes is an accurate estimate of China’s defense spending.
In 2019, China reported a national defense budget of 1.2 trillion yuan, or approximately $175 billion. This makes China’s reported military spending the second highest in the world, after the United States (whose 2019 military expenditures totaled $688 billion, excluding spending on nuclear warhead production). According to SIPRI, a more accurate estimate of Chinese military expenditures in 2019 would be 1,660 yuan, or approximately $240 billion – considerably higher than the official tally, but still far less than total U.S. spending.
To access the report, click here
China Authorizes Its Coast Guard to Fire on Foreign Vessels if Needed
By empowering Chinese Coast Guard vessels to fire on foreign vessels, China’s National People’s Congress has ratcheted up military tensions in the South and East China Seas. On January 22, Reuters reported, it adopted a law that “for the first time explicitly allows its coast guard to fire on foreign vessels.”
In the past, China has dispatched its coast guard vessels to drive away fishing boats and other vessels from islands it claims in the South China Sea, in some cases resulting in the sinking of those ships. Although the International Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled in 2016 that China’s claim to the South China Sea islands is invalid, Beijing continues to insist on its ownership of the islands and rejects the claims of Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
The new law mandates the coast guard use “all necessary means” to stop or prevent threats from foreign vessels. Its provisions indicate in which circumstances which kind of weapons can be used.
As Reuters reports, “The bill allows coast guard personnel to demolish other countries’ structures built on Chinese-claimed reefs and to board and inspect foreign vessels in waters claimed by China.” It also empowers the coastguard to create temporary exclusion zones ‘as needed’ to stop other vessels and personnel from entering.
The new law has raised deep concerns, especially in Japan, where its coast guard and naval forces are constitutionally prohibited from using armed force in nearly all circumstances. This has led Japanese authorities to appeal to the United States to fulfill its Mutual Defense Treaty obligation to support Japan, in this case protect Japan’s Senkaku (Diaoyu) island claims from the potentially overwhelming size of Chinese coast guard deployments.
In his first appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee as President Biden’s choice to be Secretary of Defense, on January 19, 2021, retired General Lloyd Austin indicated that he viewed China as the country’s number one security threat. “I understand that Asia must be the focus of our effort. And I see China, in particular, as the pacing challenge for the Department,” he avowed in a prepared statement for the Committee.
As is customary, General Austin was asked by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to answer numerous questions about the threats to U.S. national security and his views on how these should be addressed. In his responses to these questions, Austin repeatedly highlighted the threats to U.S. security posed by China and the need to bolster U.S. capabilities to resist those threats. Below are some examples of these questions and answers.
Q: The 2018 NDS [National Defense Strategy] outlines that the United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
Austin: I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identifies strategic competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges animating the global security environment; however, I believe that because of its ascent and the scope and scale of its military modernization, China is the top priority.
Q: What is your assessment of the military threat posed by the People’s Republic of China?
Austin: I assess that the rapid development and operational focus of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) constitutes a significant and long-term security threat to the United States and to our allies and partners. This threat is an outgrowth of nearly two decades of intense efforts by China to modernize and reform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and other forces into an increasingly capable joint force able to conduct the full range of military operations across every warfighting domain. In addition to a significant buildup and modernization of its strategic [nuclear] forces, the PLA is advancing its capabilities and concepts for conducting information, cyber, space, and counterspace operations. China has also made it clear that it expects the PLA to be a global military actor that is able to secure China’s growing overseas interests and advance other PRC objectives abroad. These changes are coupled with the PRC’s aggressive and at times coercive activities 7 aimed at advancing its military influence through forging closer ties with foreign militaries, attaining overseas military bases, and expanding the PLA’s presence worldwide.
Q: Do you share security concerns about China’s growing influence in the European area, and if so, what role do you see for NATO in addressing these concerns?
Austin: Yes, China’s growing influence and international policies present challenges in the European area that NATO needs to address. The Alliance acknowledged China’s growing influence in 2019 and finalized a comprehensive report on China in December 2020, which are important steps in understanding and addressing the implications of China’s rise. The next step will be the inclusion of China in the Alliance’s forthcoming strategic concept. Among other things, NATO’s role should include intelligence sharing on the risks posed by China, political and economic coordination (including with the EU), and continuing to help increase the resilience of Member States, including their critical infrastructure and secure communications.
Q: In your assessment, how should the United States adapt to this shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific?
Austin: China’s military modernization, coupled with its aggressive and coercive actions, presents an increasingly urgent challenge to our vital interests in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The Biden administration will view China as our most serious global competitor and, from a defense perspective, the pacing threat in most areas. If confirmed, I will further focus the Department on China and work to identify and prioritize those programs most critical to maintaining a favorable maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific. That will include investing to maintain our technological advantage and developing new concepts and capabilities to counter China across the spectrum of conflict; updating U.S. force posture in the region, including through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative; and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. (Emphasis added.)
Q: Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a triad of delivery platforms it adheres to the full meaning of “no first use”?
Austin: I believe that it is important that we have a complete understanding of China’s intentions and capabilities when assessing the threat it poses to strategic stability and US interests in East Asia. If confirmed, I will request a comprehensive review of China’s nuclear weapons program, including its declaratory policy.
For the full text of these interchanges, click here.